

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 CAIRO 09696 01 OF 02 191236Z

43 S

ACTION MMO-02

INFO OCT-01 SS-15 NEA-10 PM-04 SNM-02 L-03 EB-07 ISO-00

/044 W

----- 061446

R 190915Z JUL 76

FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5339

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 CAIRO 9696

STADIS////////////////////////////////////

FOR DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER FROM AMBASSADOR

EO 11652: NA

TAGS: APER

SUBJECT: MODE REQUEST TO REVIEW AND VERIFY MISSION STAFFING

REF: (A) STATE A-02527, MAY 18, 1976, (B) STATE 151270,
(C) CAIRO A-128

1. AS REQUESTED, I HAVE PERSONALLY REVIEWED CAIRO STAFFING
PATTERN. OUR COMMENTS ON IT ARE CONTAINED IN REF C,
WHICH I HAVE APPROVED. A FEW SUPPLEMENTARY OBSERVATIONS
ON OUR SUBMISSION AND RELATED MATTERS MAY BE HELPFUL.

2. SOME GENERAL COMMENTS: AS YOU WILL SEE, WE HAVE
DETERMINED A REQUIREMENT FOR FOUR ADDITIONAL
SHARED POSITIONS -- THEY ARE (A) A SECOND PERSONNEL
OFFICER, (B) ANOTHER SECRETARY, (C) ANOTHER SUPPORT
COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER (D) A SECOND BUDGET AND FISCAL
OFFICER. I HAVE RELUCTANTLY COME TO THE CONCLUSION
THAT THESE ARE NEEDED FOR DEMONSTRATED ESSENTIAL
REQUIREMENTS. JUSTIFICATIONS WILL BE SENT TO PER
BY SEPARATE MESSAGE.

3. ONE PROBLEM WITH TRYING TO KEEP A MISSION WITH
ENORMOUS WORK LOAD OF CAIRO LEAN, WHICH I HAVE LABORED
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 CAIRO 09696 01 OF 02 191236Z

TO DO, IS THAT IT GIVES ONE NO SLACK TO ABSORB GROWING

REQUIREMENTS OR SICKENESSES, LEAVES, ETC. THE STAFF OF THIS EMBASSY, PARTICULARLY OUR STATE PEOPLE, HAVE PERFORMED IN EXEMPLARY FASHION. THEY ARE ALL OVERWORKED AND DEAD TIRED, YET ALWAYS RESPOND MAGNIFICENTLY WHEN CALLED UPON. THE SECOND PROBLEM IS THAT THE CONCEPT ASSUMES ONLY TOP NOTCH PEOPLE WILL BE ASSIGNED; HENCE, THE WORK DISTRIBUTION PATTERN IS BASED ON THE ADDITIONAL WORK SUCH OUTSTANDING PEOPLE CAN DO OVER AND ABOVE WHAT MIGHT BE EXPECTED OF A MORE AVERAGE OFFICER. ONCE ONE NO LONGER GETS SPECIALLY PICKED TOP NOTCH PEOPLE, SUCH AS WE INITIALLY HAD, SOME OF THE NEWCOMERS, THOUGH GOOD OFFERS, FIND THEY SIMPLY CANNOT COPE WITH THE WORKLOAD OF THEIR PREDECESSORS AND SOMETHING HAS TO GIVE OR BE LEFT UNDONE. I DO NOT FAULT PER WHICH IS DOING ITS BEST, BUT HAVE HAD TO RECOGNIZE THAT I CANNOT REGULARLY EXPECT TO GET THE VERY BEST PEOPLE. HENCE, I MUST CONFIGURE THE EMBASSY TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE LIKELIHOOD THAT WE WILL GET A GREATER SHARE OF THE AVERAGE OFFICER OR PERHAPS EVEN SOME WHO ARE BELOW THAT LINE. IN THIS REGARD, I DO NOT ENTIRELY BUY CARROL'S POSITION THAT IT IS UP TO THE POSTS TO TRAIN OFFICERS. NO ONE DENIES THE NEED FOR SOME TRAINING, BUT I AM CONCERNED THAT THIS APPROACH IS TOO CONVENIENT A WAY TO SLOUGH OFF DUDS ON TO POSTS AND THEN BLAME THE POSTS FOR FAILING TO TRAIN THEM. I KNOW THIS IS NOT INTENDED, BUT I FORESEE THAT THAT IS THE WAY IT SOMETIMES COMES OUT. UNFORTUNATELY, WE DO HAVE OUR SHARE OF DUDS IN THE FOREIGN SERVICE WHO EITHER DO NOT RESPOND TO TRAINING EFFORTS BECAUSE OF LACK OF ABILITY, DRIVE AND MOTIVATION, OR REQUIRE SO MUCH OF ANOTHER OFFICER'S TIME TO TRAIN THAT IT DETRACTS FROM THE LATTER'S ABILITY TO DO HIS OWN WORK.

4. AID: AS YOU KNOW, CAIRO IS SCHEDULED TO BECOME A JOINT ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE (JAO) ON OCTOBER 1, 1976 (I.E, FY 77). MEANWHILE, TO BOLSTER OUR HARDPRESSED ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION, USAID HAS ASSIGNED THREE OFFICERS, PRIMARILY AS GSOS, TO BE IN EMBASSY ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION TO ASSIST WITH LOGISTICS OF ABSORBING THE RAPID INCREASE IN MISSION PERSONNEL. THIS INCREASE IS MAINLY AID PERSONNEL
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 CAIRO 09696 01 OF 02 191236Z

TO HANDLE THE BILLION DOLLAR A YEAR PROGRAM WHICH WE KNOW HAVE. I KNOW ALL OF THE PROBLEMS WITH JAOS AND HAVE HAD DIRE COMMENTS THAT MOST OF THEM HAVE FAILED. I AM DETERMINED, IF AT ALL POSSIBLE, TO MAKE THIS ONE WORK, SINCE I DO NOT WANT TWO COMPETING ADMINISTRATIVE SECTIONS IN THE MISSION. HOWEVER, I SENSE FROM TIME TO TOME THAT AID/W MAY NOT BE ENTIRELY HAPPY WITH THIS IDEA, EVEN THOUGH IT HAS FOR THE MOMENT AGREED, AND

RATHER SUSPECT THAT AT SOME TIME THEY MAY ARGUE FOR A SEPARATE AID ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION. I DO NOT KNOW WHAT PERTINENT DISCUSSIONS AID/W MAY HAVE HAD WITH NEW AID DIRECTOR BROWN, BUT I WOULD NOT BE SURPRISED IF, AFTER HE GETS HERE, I WILL BE BOMBARDED WITH REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL AID POSITIONS.

5. AS I ONCE REPORTED TO YOU, AID/W INITIALLY PROPOSED SOMETHING OVER 70 POSITIONS WHICH IT FELT WAS THE ESSENTIAL MINIMUM TO COPE WITH THE BILLION DOLLAR PROGRAM. THERE WERE THINGS LIKE EIGHT PROGRAM OFFICERS, EIGHT PROJECT OFFICERS, ETC. I ULTIMATELY AGREED TO 51, POINTING OUT THAT BEFORE I WOULD AGREE TO EIGHT PROGRAM OFFICERS, ET. AL, IT HAS TO BE PROVEN TO ME THAT A SMALLER NUMBER CANNOT DO THE JOB. WHILE MY AID DIRECTOR HERE AGREES WITH ME, AID/W ACCEPTED ONLY WITH RELUCTANCE. I TOLD THEM THAT IF IT IS DEMONSTRATED THAT THE 51 OFFICERS CANNOT DO THE JOB, AND I FULLY SHARE AID/W'S CONCERN THAT THE PROGRAM OPERATE FLAWLESSLY, I WOULD BE PREPARED TO LOOK AT ADDITIONAL OFFICERS ON A CASE BY CASE BASIS. AS OF JUNE 30, WE HAVE ONLY 31 AID OFFICERS ABOARD, INCLUDING THE THREE GOSS, SO AID STILL HAS 20 PEOPLE TO PROVIDE. HOWEVER, I HAVE LEARNED INFORMALLY THAT AID/W IS AGAIN PROPOSING A ROSTER OF WHAT WILL AMOUNT TO OVER 70 OFFICERS. THE THEORY IS THAT THE 51 CANNOT DO IT, EVEN THOUGH THIS IS NOT DEMONSTRATED; HENCE, ON A CONTINGUENCY BASES THEY SHOULD START RECRUITING 70 OR MORE. I SUSPECT BROWN WILL BE INSTRUCTED TO PRESS FOR THIS WHEN HE GETS HERE. MY VIEWS ON THE SUBJECT HAVE NOT CHANGED, BUT YOU MAY HEAR MORE ABOUT IT. WE ALL WALLOW IN OUR PAPERWORK, BUT AID IS ONE OF THE WORST SINNERS IN THIS REGARD.
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 CAIRO 09696 01 OF 02 191236Z

NOTE BY OC/T: DISTRIBUTION COORDINATED WITH S/S-O, MR. MACK.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 CAIRO 09696 02 OF 02 191151Z

44-S

ACTION MMO-02

INFO OCT-01 SS-15 NEA-10 PM-04 SNM-02 L-03 EB-07 ISO-00

/044 W

----- 060942

R 190915Z JUL 76

FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5340

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 CAIRO 9696

STADIS////////////////////////////////////

6. I HAVE AGREED, AS INDICATED ABOVE, TO ONE ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL OFFICER, WHO SHOULD BE FROM AID. MY STATE PERSONNEL OFFICER, WHO HAS THUS FAR ALSO HAD TO HANDLE AID PERSONNEL, HAS FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO DO SO, SINCE AID PERSONNEL FORMS AND PROCEDURES ARE APPARENTLY QUITE DIFFERENT FROM OUR OWN AND SHE HAS NO BACKGROUND IN THOSE PROCEDURES. I GO ON THE PROPOSITION THAT ONE PERSONNEL OFFICER FOR FIFTY AMERICANS IS A REASONABLE RATIO AND WE ARE WELL OVER THAT AND WILL BE EVEN MORE SO WHEN AID PROVIDES THE ADDITIONAL 20 BODIES WHICH I HAVE AGREED TO. IF THE NEWLY REQUESTED PERSONNEL OFFICER IS AID, I WOULD PROPOSE TO PUT HIM/HER IN THE JAO, BUT SPECIFICALLY CHARGED WITH HANDLING AID PERSONNEL AND TO ASSIST IN OTHER PERSONNEL MATTERS AS FEASIBLE.

7. LEGAL ATTACHE: RE REFTEL B, THE LEGAL ATTACHE IN ROME HAS REGIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES FOR EGYPT AND PROVIDES SUPPORT AND COVER AS NEEDED. THIS ARRANGEMENT IS STAISFACTORY AND I SEE NO NEED FOR A LEGAL ATTACHE RESIDENT IN CAIRO.

8. DEA: ON THE DEA SIDE, WE HAVE NO PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE AT POST. WE RECENTLY HAD A DEA OFFICER HERE ON A SURVEY VISIT WHO PROPOSED A DEA OFFICE OF THREE PEOPLE. I REJECTED THAT AND FOR THE MOMENT DEA CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 CAIRO 09696 02 OF 02 191151Z

IS NOT PUSHING THE CASE. I FULLY SHARE THE OBJECTIVE OF THE NARCOTICS PROGRAM, BUT BELIEVE THAT SO AR AS EGYPT IS CONCERNED, IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO HANDLE MATTERS BY TDYS FROM THE DEA REGIONAL HEADQUARTERS IN ANKARA. I HAVE NO PROBLEM WITH SUCH TDYS BEING HERE 30 DAYS OR AS LONG AS NECESSARY.

9. MILITARY: ON THE MILITARY SIDE, WE ALREADY PROVIDE COMPLETE LOGISTICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT TO THE DAO ON A SAS BASIS WITH THE EXCEPTION OF AREAS UNIQUE TO THE MILITARY; I.E., SPECIAL ALLOWANCES, PERSONNEL EVALUATIONS, VEHICLES AND OTHER MILITARY PROCUREMENT. FOR THAT, THE DAO HAS ONE WARRANT OFFICER. I HAVE CONSIDERED WHETHER WE COULD ABSORB THAT UNIQUE FUNCTION BUT CONCLUDED THAT WE REALLY CANNOT DO SO EFFECTIVELY IN OUR PRESENT CONFIGURATION. YOU MAY BE AWARE, HOWEVER, THAT THERE ARE ELEMENTS IN DOD THAT WOULD LIKE TO INCREASE THE SIZE OF THE DAO OFFICE HERE. DIA TALKS ABOUT HAVING SOME CAPTAINS AND MAJORS HERE, ARGUING THAT OFFICERS OF SUCH RANK WOULD ENABLE US TO CONTACT THE EGYPTIAN MILITARY AT THAT LEVEL. THAT IS A FALSE RATIONALE. THE EGYPTIAN MILITARY IS, BY STRICT ORDER, VERY INSULATED, AND CONTACTS WITH MILITARY OFFICERS OTHER THAN THOSE SPECIFICALLY DESIGNATED FOR THE PURPOSE ARE SIMPLY NOT POSSIBLE AT THIS TIME. LUKE BATTLE USED TO SAY HE HAD OVER 30 DAO PERSONNEL, WHO COULD DO LITTLE BUT TALK TO EACH OTHER. DIA WOULD ALSO LIKE TO SEND AN AIRCRAFT THERE WITH CREW. I SEE NO PRESENT NEED FOR SUCH AN AIRCRAFT AND THE ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL ENTAILED IN HAVING ONE.

10. SINCE DOD HAS APPARENTLY DECIDED THAT DAO OFFICER MAY NO LONGER HANDLE MILITARY SALES, USCINCEUR, PRESUMABLY WITH DOD APPROVAL, HAS PROPOSED ASSIGNING THREE CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES TO HANDLE FMS SALES. SINCE WE HAVE NO SUCH SALES OTHER THAN THE NEWLY CONCLUDED C-130 ARRANGEMENT, I SEE NO PRESENT NEED FOR SUCH AN ADDED STAFF AND HAVE SO INDICATED TO THE APPROPRIATE CINCEUR AUTHORITIES. SHOULD WE EVER DEVELOP A SIGNIFICANT FMS SALES TO EGYPT, WHICH I HOPE WILL EVENTUALLY BE THE CASE, THIS WILL, OF COURSE, HAVE TO

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 CAIRO 09696 02 OF 02 191151Z

BE RECONSIDERED. FOR NOW, HOWEVER, THERE IS NO NEED.

11. OPIC: A FEW MONTHS AGO, SECRETARY SIMON GOT THE BRIGHT IDEA THAT THE WAY TO STIMULATE INVESTMENT IN EGYPT WAS TO ASSIGN A RESIDENT OPIC REPRESENTATIVE. THERE ARE NUMEROUS REASONS WHICH HAVE INHIBITED AMERICAN PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN EGYPT, BUT THE ABSENCE OF AN OPIC REPRESENTATIVE IS NOT ONE OF THEM. IT WAS ONE OF THOSE LITTLE GIMMICKS WHICH TREASURY TROTS OUT WHEN IT CANNOT CONTRIBUTE ANYTHING MORE SUBSTANTIVE. IN ANY EVENT, I OPPOSED THE ASSIGNMENT OF A PERMANENT OPIC REPRESENTATIVE AND HAVE SINCE HEARD NO MORE OF IT. THE SUBJECT MAY, OF COURSE, ARISE AGAIN.

12. COMMERCE: COMMERCE, WITH EB SUPPORT, ALSO PROPOSED SOME SIX MONTHS AGO THAT THE ERSHWILE RTDO IN BEIRUT, NOW IN ATHENS, BE RELOCATED IN CAIRO. WHILE I STRONGLY BACK THE CONCEPT OF PROMOTING US TRADE ABROAD, I QUESTION THE VALUE OF THE RTDO BEING RELOCATED HERE AND OPPOSED THIS IDEA (CAIRO 453). THIS, TOO, WILL DOUBTLESS AT SOME POINT BE REVIVED. INCIDENTALLY, I AM BEGINNING TO WONDER WHETHER THE AMERICAN TAXPAYER MAY NOT BE BETTER SERVED IF WE HAD COMMERCE OFFICERS IN OUR COMMERCIAL SLOTS RATHER THAN REGULAR FSO'S. I RECOGNIZE THIS IS HERESY, BUT I AM DISTURBED BY THE LACK OF COMMERCIAL BACKGROUND WHICH SO MANY OKFJR FS COMMERCIAL OFFICERS BRING WITH THEM.

13. REGIONAL OFFICERS: AS YOU DOUBTLESS ALSO KNOWN, THOSE US AGENCIES THAT HAD REGIONAL OFFICERS IN BEIRUT HAVE FOR SOME TIME BEEN PRESSING TO HAVE THEM RELOCATED IN CAIRO. I HAVE OPPOSED THIS ON SEVERAL GROUNDS: (A) THEY CONTRIBUTE ONLY marginally TO THE WORK OF THIS MISSION, YET WOULD ADD A CONSIDERABLE ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN, WHICH WOULD REQUIRE INCREASED STAFFING, (B) THEY ADD TO OUR PROFILE HERE, WHICH I HAVE TO ADMIT IS ALREADY A BIT HIGHER THAN IT WAS, (C) THEY ARE A DRAIN ON SCARCE HOUSING AND OTHER RESOURCES, WHICH WE BADLY NEED FOR OUR EGYPT MISSION ORIENTED PERSONNEL IN BADLY OVER-CROWDED CAIRO. ONE ARGUMENT FOR HAVING REGIONAL OFFICERS HERE IS, OF COURSE, THE CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 CAIRO 09696 02 OF 02 191151Z

AVAILABILITY OF PL 480 POUNDS AND CAIRO'S CENTRAL LOCATION. IN MY JUDGMENT, THESE ARE OUTWEIGHTED BY THE NEGATIVE CONSIDERATIONS THAT I HAVE MENTIONED.

14. I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT I AM WATCHING THE STAFFING PATTERN CLOSELY AND SEEKING TO KEEP IT DOWN, BUT THE VARIOUS USG AGENCIES' PRESSURES FOR MORE STAFF IN CAIRO IS STRONG AND INCREASING. WITHOUT CONTINUING STATE SUPPORT, THEY WILL SOONER OR LATER BEGIN TO BREAK DOWN THE BARRIERS.
EILTS

NOTE BY OC/T: DISTRIBUTION COORDINATED WITH SS-O MR. MACK.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: PERSONNEL, DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 19 JUL 1976
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: GarlanWA
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1976CAIRO09696
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: DG ALTERED
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D760277-0230
From: CAIRO
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1976/newtext/t19760746/aaaabnru.tel
Line Count: 323
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION MMO
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: STADIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 6
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: STADIS
Reference: 76 STATE A-2527, 76 STATE 151270
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: GarlanWA
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 03 NOV 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <03 NOV 2003 by GarlanWA>; APPROVED <04 NOV 2003 by GarlanWA>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
04 MAY 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MODE REQUEST TO REVIEW AND VERIFY MISSION STAFFING
TAGS: APER, AFSP, PDIP
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006